798 are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the East China Region.

II. BUDDHISM

779 798 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai-hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered severe attrition. Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of the Buddhist

779 798 establishments were converted into schools, barracks, and police stations.[5]

The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated widespread anti-Buddhist sentiment through Free and Occupied China.

779 The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parasitic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained largely negative.[6]

---

5. Cf., Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

6. Chan, Religious Trends, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to 70 per cent made choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine, deep faith; presented to church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

779 Thus gradual extinction of the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time. But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy and establishments in the East China Region were numerous.[7]

Provinces and Major Cities	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries, and Nunneries
Shantung	4,730	2,110
Kiangsu	171,760	84,549
Anhwei	29,540	9,280
Shanghai	6,200	6,160
Nanking	1,340	850
Chekiang	107,700	58,912
Fukien	33,360	12,130

It is not possible to trace the decline from 1930 onward, but the pressures of war and invasio added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of both clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to "less than 100" in 1954.[10]

7. Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook], 1933, p. T2.

8. Ibid. Basis of figures is data collected by China Buddhist Association.

9. Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on China Mainland, (a 4-page pamphlet), Buddhist Assoc. of China, Taiwan, 1954; hereinafter cited as Atrocities.

10. Ibid.

779 792 Estimates on the total number of clergy[11] vary, but in 1931 they appear to have numbered 500,000 to 600,000. Recent refugees report that four out of every seven clerics have been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954 it was estimated that there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its dwindling influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

779 While the traditional clergy was in decline, Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. The leadership of this movement was largely from the East China Region. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: that an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the Red Swatika Society (modeled on the Red Cross), YMBA and YWBA patterened on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were organized. Buddhist writing

11. Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
12. Chan op. cit., pp. 90-91.
13. Atrocities.

779 and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religion, continued as the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947. but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented pan-Asians. The great abbot T'ai-hsü master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive long-range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure; when the Communists came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. Some residue of the modern Buddhist movement may be found in the East China Region, and the statistics of 1930 show the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang as the geographical center of that movement. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers then claimed by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

14. Chan, op. cit., pp. 1-62, points out that 537 Buddhist works and 58 Buddhist periodicals were published in the years 1920-35 in all parts of China. Most of the periodicals were short-lived.

15. Shen-pao Yearbook, 1933, p. T2.

779

Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Shantung	5,730	5
Anhwei	105,300	22
Kiangsu	1,139,540	104
Chekiang	1,367,800	64
Fukien	96,870	21

779
668 Some Buddist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have been published, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, it is used as a propaganda device to allay their fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it is also used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia and Tibet.[18] Domestically

16. Atrocities. According to this report, circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when

[continued next page.]

779 668 the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use by the state. One source, admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1.[20] Certain Buddhist monuments of

---

17. [continued] 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsü Yün have been chosen as honorary presidents of Buddhist Association. Cf., Buddhism in China, p. 20.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

20. Atrocities.

779
668 historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on nearby farms. In Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22]

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birthday.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying out. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to "succeed" under the present regime.

---

21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

779 668 The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

III. TAOISM

779 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scriptures, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens

24. Outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religous and social work, the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf., Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revivalof the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Teacher" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant; the Nationalist government then confiscated the lands which had long supported

25. [from previous page.] The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt with in chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

26. Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

27. Ibid., p. 152.

779 the Po-yün-kuan.

Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communists will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "Religious Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the support of religious groups, they invited representatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but there was no representative of Taoism.[29]

Folk Taoism in the present study includes all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect.

28. Shina mondai jiten [Encyclopedia of China Problems,] Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

30. Cf. Chan op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance even occasionally, of effective modern doctors, have steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshipped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[30] One sample survey showed that in the early 1930's, 53 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for their original purpose;[31] the decline in the last twenty-five years has been accelerated.

In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists have moved to bring to an end a complex of ancient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from the local witch doctors, and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer."[32] On all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns" such as the Patriotic Hygiene Movement and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," "unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of

30. [See previous page.]

31. C. S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

32. Fu-nü-San-tzu Ching [The Three-Character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

779 folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

575 Another Taoist-linked institution is the secret society. These organizations have traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies, doctrines, and patron deities from religious and folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social and political functions: they provide, especially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had

33. Cf. B. Favre, Les sociétés secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

575 A Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated that the I-kuan Tao was still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, cf. the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Mohammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

779 563 The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear

42. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

779 white headdresses resembling turbans; they ab-
563 stain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize -- keeping inns and organizing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

779 The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem
794 village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Imam, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes, interprets Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in Arabic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

779 In the East China Region, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces. But the major centers, now recognized by the Communists as "Autonomous Areas," lie in the Southwest, the Northwest, and in Central Asia. The

43. Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

44. Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems.

779 following table[45] of believers and religious establishments (probably mosques) gives some indication of their distribution throughout the region, as of 1938. However, the source of these figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars think is far too high.[46]

Province	Mosques	Adherents
Shantung	2,513	2,890,530
Anhwei	1,505	2,288,580
Kiangsu	1,302	1,963,170
Chekiang	239	357,300
Fukien	257	471,750

Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay readers to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and

45. Chung-kuo Nien-chien [Chinese Yearbook], 1948, pp. 126-27.

46. Cf. the admirable summary of statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammedan scholar Pai Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Languages Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China AF15

779 non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

As the Chinese Moslems came out of isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslems with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary way developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874), and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[48]

---

47. Cf. Chan, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
48. Chan, op. cit., pp. 192-94.

●779 Chinese Mohammedans in the course of the modernist movement, accepted the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic, and opened schools which taught general as well as religious subjects. And they began, like modernists of other faiths, to emphasize the compatability between the Koran and modern science.[49] They published modern periodicals, of which there were nine in 1947; circulation, however, was small. In 1936 the first Chinese Moslem to be so honored received a degree from El Ashar University, the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo. By 1950 the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or co-ordinated two-hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese learning born of religious conservatism.[50]

779
668 What have been Chinese Communist policies toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the East China Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted toward major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious

49. Chan, op. cit., p. 198.
50. Chan, op. cit., pp. 198-205.

779 668 policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have

---

51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

779 668 been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[53]

The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all

52. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

53. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

54. Chinese Moslems, introduction. [See next page.]

779 668 peace-loving Moslems."[54] Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not know Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little reliable information on the Islamic communities of East China today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the government, and the youth will tend in time to become more Communist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit communities in East China will probably proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth now classified as "workers";[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive

55. A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students

56. NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955; SCMP 1067, p. 23.

779 668 separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce suspicion and resistance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of East China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large regional communities in the Southwest and the Northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in East China. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

797 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.